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Litigation
Xiang Yu* & Anjan Chatterji**
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Pay-for-delay settlements, also known as reverse exclusionary settlements, have
evoked much debate amongst the legal, economic, and political communities over the last
decade. A pay-for-delay settlement arises from a patent infringement action between a
brand and a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer where the settlement payment flows
from the patentee brand to the alleged infringer generic. When the brand pays off the
generic challenger and delays the challenger’s launch of a generic product, such a
settlement may appear to be collusive market division and may trigger antitrust
enforcement actions.
However, the phenomenon of reverse payments cannot be viewed in isolation. To
understand the deeper legal and economic underpinnings of these settlements and
associated reverse payments, it is important to place antitrust law in the particular context
of the pharmaceutical industry and the Hatch-Waxman Act. To understand the dynamics
of reverse payments, it is critical to understand the asymmetric risks the brand and the
generic bear in patent litigation. Although a brand heavily relies on its patents to ensure
profits and sustain research and development (R&D), the Hatch-Waxman Act makes it
particularly susceptible to patent challenges. Therefore, for a brand, to settle with or
without reverse payments or to litigate is usually a conscious business decision based on
risk management. A brand may choose settlement over litigation even if it has strong
reasons to believe the validity of its patent will be upheld by the court.
In this Article we propose a quantitative settlement model and systematically
evaluate the risks of litigation to both the brand and the generic. Evaluation of the
economic benefit suggests that both parties usually prefer settlement with reverse
payment over litigation. In addition, the model suggests that launch at risk1 by a generic
*
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Launch at risk refers to a generic manufacturer’s launch of a generic product after the FDA’s approval of
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) but prior to a federal district court’s decision on the patent
infringement dispute brought by a brand manufacturer against the generic.
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is unlikely because the potential damages for which the generic may be liable lower the
expected value of economic reward to the generic, a result consistent with general
observations. Assessing existing United States courts of appeals cases, this Article also
finds that reverse payment is consistent with risk aversion and that no collusion is
necessary for a brand to make a rational decision to pay the generic. These results
suggest that a clear understanding of the asymmetric risks the brand and the generic bear
is important to make a correct judgment on the use of reverse payment and the legality of
a pay-for-delay settlement. The results also support a “Rule of Reason”2 analysis of
antitrust liability because a per se illegal ruling ignores the underlying economic
rationales. Since the patentee owns the default property rights, the Rule of Reason test
should incorporate the scope of patent protection. Further, because the ultimate goal of
antitrust law is to protect consumer welfare, a careful assessment of consumer welfare
should be employed as part of the Rule of Reason analysis. The brand patentee,
therefore, should be free to settle a dispute on its patent as long as there is no
unreasonable impairment of consumer welfare.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS
A. Generic Challenge Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
¶4

¶5

The Drug Price and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act, greatly facilitates Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval
for, and the sale of, low-cost generic drugs. The Hatch-Waxman Act only requires a
generic manufacturer to demonstrate the “bioequivalence” of its generic product to the
“pioneer” or brand drug as opposed to requiring lengthy and costly clinical trials.3 Also,
the generic is only required to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with
the FDA instead of a full New Drug Application (NDA).4 Further, to encourage generics
to enter the market earlier, before the patent on a brand drug expires, the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides a strong incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge the brand’s patent
validity. The Act offers generics the opportunity to earn a bounty: the first ANDA filer
receives the exclusive right to sell the generic version of the brand drug for 180 days.5
The value of the bounty can be enormous, perhaps hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars
when the brand drug being challenged is a “blockbuster” drug.6
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a typical generic challenge works as follows:
before the patent on a brand drug expires, the generic files an ANDA and a Paragraph IV
certification challenging the validity of the patent or claiming that the patent is not
2

Rule of Reason is a doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States developed in its interpretation of the
Sherman Act as an alternative to per se violation, which condemns monopoly power as inherently illegal.
Chief Justice Edward White developed the Rule of Reason doctrine in his Standard Oil opinion and stated
that only combinations and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade are subject to antitrust actions.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 96 (1911).
3

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(I), (j)(8)(C) (2006).
Id.
5
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
6
See, e.g., Pfizer Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 26, 2010) (reporting the median revenue for
several major Pfizer biopharmaceutical products is $700 million).
4
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infringed.7 The brand has up to forty-five days from the date it receives notice from the
ANDA filer to file a patent infringement action.8 When the brand files suit, the FDA
approval of the ANDA is stayed for thirty months unless the patent is ruled invalid,9 and
such a stay can extend to several years.10 In light of the pending patent litigation and the
high economic stakes involved, the brand may settle with the generic challenger.
Sometimes the settlement provides that the brand makes payments to the generic, the
alleged patent infringer, to delay the generic’s entry into the market. Such a settlement is
often referred to as a pay-for-delay or a reverse exclusionary settlement.
B. Pay-for-Delay Is a By-product of the Hatch-Waxman Act
¶6

Pay-for-delay is probably an unintended consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The patent infringement action that results from an ANDA filing is an artificial one.11
The generic is generally exempted from infringing the patented drug in the process of the
ANDA preparation.12 The infringement cause of action is triggered only through the
ANDA filing. On one hand, there is a strong economic incentive for the generic to
challenge the brand’s patent despite a low economic reward even if the challenge is
successful. If the generic loses the challenge, it incurs mostly litigation expenses, usually
several million dollars worth. A court is likely to award only minimal damages for this
patent infringement because there have not yet been any sales of the generic drug. Thus,
for a small price, the potential upside for the generic challenger is enormous. This
creates an incentive for the generic to adopt a risk-seeking posture and to file challenges
to a brand’s patent. The brand is often risk-averse and has every desire to settle the
uncertainty, even if it has strong defenses for the patent’s validity, because it has so much
to lose and nothing to gain. If the brand loses, then most, if not all, of its patent-granted
monopoly profits are lost. If it prevails, its economic position is essentially the same as it
had been before the challenge because the court likely will not award it any damages or
royalties. As a result, these lawsuits usually settle, and payments may be involved.
Some commentators have argued that the only possible directional flow of the payment in
a settlement with such exceedingly asymmetric risks would be the reverse flow—from
the brand patent holder to the alleged generic infringer.13
7

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Id. § 355(c)(3)(C).
9
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(BB).
10
Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006).
11
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676–78 (1990).
12
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the
Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”).
13
See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and
Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 765–76 (2002) (suggesting payment can go either way in a
rational settlement depending on economic stakes and negotiating power between the settling parties). But
see Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent
8
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What appears to be highly controversial is the direction in which the settlement
payments flow when those payments flow from the patentee, the brand, to the alleged
infringer, the generic. Pay-for-delay settlements have caught the attention of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and various consumer advocacy groups. The FTC opposes
such settlements as a conspiracy to divide the pie of consumer surplus between the brand
and the generic, while consumers lose the benefit of lower price from generic entry.14 In
a recent report, the FTC claimed that on average a generic’s entry into the market is
delayed for seventeen months due to such settlements and that the consumer loss amounts
to $3.5 billion annually.15 The FTC has challenged these settlements vigorously because
it believes such settlements are collusive, illegal payoffs to prevent generic competition.16
C. The Legal Dilemma on Pay-for-Delay Settlements

¶8

¶9

The law on pay-for-delay settlements is far from settled. The FTC challenges payfor-delay settlements as violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act on the basis that such
settlements constitute horizontal market division and unreasonable restraint of trade.17
However, the purpose of the settlements is to resolve patent disputes; thus, since patents
are legal monopolies, these settlements inevitably support such legal monopolies unless
the patents are invalid. The patent system has been adopted to incentivize continuing
innovation, and some studies have found that society’s return on investment in R&D
leading to innovation is significantly larger than the return on investment to the person or
organization financing the R&D.18
A patent entitles the patentee to a legal monopoly for a limited period of time, a
monopoly which is exempt from antitrust law. The patent’s validity is dispositive. If the
patent is invalid, so are the monopoly and any agreements associated with it. This raises
several questions. Is a patent not presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise?19
Before we impose any antitrust liability, should we first determine whether the patent is
valid? When the two parties settle, can we claim ex ante that the patent is invalid, and,
thus, antitrust law comes into play? When patent law and antitrust law conflict, which

Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, SPRING 2003, at 68, 69–70 (asserting that payment flow can only
be one-way in the reverse direction because the generic has prospect of free entry while having no exposure
to infringement damages).
14
Pay To Delay: Are Patent Settlements that Delay Generic Drug Market Entry Anticompetitive?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17–
18 (2009) (prepared statement of Richard Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade
Comm’n).
15
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2
(2010) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
16
See id. at 7.
17
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Section 1 of the Sherman Act purports to condemn “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”).
18
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 6–7 (1995). Social economic studies have long established
that the social rate of return on R&D is twice that of the private rate of return to the inventor. For a list of
econometric studies and a summary of their findings, see id. at 7 tbl.2.
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
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one prevails? Some commentators have argued that patent validity is irrelevant in patent
settlements,20 while others insist that it is the most important element of pay-for-delay.21
¶10
The answers to these questions are not clear; the courts are split as to which legal
standard should apply to pay-for-delay settlements. Rulings have ranged from per se
illegal (in the Sixth Circuit)22 to almost per se legal (in the Second Circuit)23 and have
included something in between with a Rule of Reason test (in the Federal and Eleventh
Circuits).24 Nonetheless, the case law seems to support that a brand and a generic may
choose to make a reasonable, competitive agreement. Even the Sixth Circuit’s per se
illegal standard should probably be read narrowly, as that case, Cardizem, involved an
FDA approved ANDA and the retention of the 180-day exclusivity after the settlement.25
Decisions from the other circuits seem to suggest that antitrust law is not undermined as
long as the settlement is within the scope of patent protection.26 Those decisions did not
discuss whether the patents at issue were valid.27
¶11
The split is not only among United States courts of appeals, but also between
antitrust enforcement agencies. While the FTC is seeking per se prohibition of reverse
20

Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 391–95 (2003) (proposing
that patent right is “probabilistic” and a patent holder is entitled to the level of protection based on its
likelihood to win a patent litigation and extent of exclusion that such a victory would permit); see also
Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin
McDonald, 17 ANTITRUST 77 (2003).
21
McDonald, supra note 133, at 70.
22
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. (Cardizem), 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit
held that the agreement for HMR to pay Andrx $10 million per quarter to refrain Andrx from selling its
generic Cardizem after FDA approval is horizontal division of market because Andrx refused to relinquish
its 180-day exclusivity. Id.
23
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tamoxifen), 466 F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second
Circuit held that reverse payments, without more, do not establish a Sherman Act violation and noted that
reverse payments are expected within the context of drug patent because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an
environment that encourages the payment. Id. at 206. In Tamoxifen, the district court found Zeneca’s
patent invalid and the agreement required that Barr obtain a vacatur of the district court’s finding. Id. at
190. In addition, Barr retained its 180-day exclusivity. Id. at 194. In a recent opinion, the Second Circuit
upheld the Tamoxifen decision as dispositive and rejected a petition for en banc hearing. Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir.), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir.
2010).
24
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro), 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that there is no restraint or “bottleneck” for future ANDA filers because the generic manufacturer
Barr failed to retain its 180-day exclusivity); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (ScheringPlough), 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that analysis of antitrust liability requires the scope
of exclusionary potential of the patent, the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope, and the
resulting anticompetitive effects).
25
Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907.
26
See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208 (holding in the Second Circuit that the patent holder is entitled to
seek a settlement in order to protect its lawful monopoly unless the patent litigation is sham or otherwise
baseless,) at 208; Shering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065–66 (holding in the Eleventh Circuit that patents, by
nature, create an environment of exclusion and consequently anticompetitive effect and that the proper
analysis of antitrust liability requires a 3-step examination, which includes the scope of patent protection).
27
See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 200 (holding in the Second Circuit that the antitrust claim brought by
the plaintiff does not require the court to examine whether the district court’s decision on patent invalidity
should be upheld or not, or whether the patent was infringed upon or not); Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1336 (holding
in the Federal Circuit that the validity of the patent will not be considered in its antitrust analysis in the
absence of fraud at the PTO.
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payments and has been actively investigating and prosecuting these settlements, the other
antitrust enforcement agency, the Department of Justice, takes a different view and
supports the Rule of Reason analysis.28 To date, the Supreme Court has not taken a payfor-delay case.
III. SETTLEMENT VERSUS LITIGATION
A. The Ongoing Debate
¶12

A great deal of debate arises from long-standing public policy and judicial
preferences for settlement over litigation. In a case in which the plaintiff made an
antitrust claim based on a settlement between Glaxo and Pentech regarding infringement
of Glaxo’s Paxil patent, Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeal for
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, stated that general policy favoring settlement extends to
patent infringement suits and that the patentee enjoys the right to either enforce its patent
or settle unless the patent is almost certainly invalid or non-infringed.29 The Cipro court
adopted the same rationale, holding that the Sherman Act does not preclude settling
patent claims, even if the settlement may have some adverse effects on competition.30
¶13
Opponents of pay-for-delay settlements equate the “reversed” flow of settlement
payments to conspiracy to divide the market.31 They also contend that the objective of
settlement, which is to save unnecessary litigation costs, has been upset by pay-for-delay
settlements because the large payments involved in such settlements far exceed the
litigation costs.32 Further, they argue that the savings on litigation costs do not make up
the losses to the consumer.33 Lastly, they argue that industry-specific regulation
undercuts patent policy in the context of industry-specific pay-for-delay settlements.34
Because brands already benefit from regulatory protection, any legal tool which
artificially stretches that protection should be subject to strict antitrust scrutiny. Thus,
opponents of settlements with reverse payments urge that they should be presumed
anticompetitive and subject to antitrust scrutiny and that the brand should bear the burden
to rebut that presumption.35
¶14
However, as Judge Posner wrote in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., any claim that settlement leads to unnecessary consumer loss must be accompanied

28

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ScheringPlough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273). The Solicitor General opposed the FTC’s petition
seeking Supreme Court review of pay-for-delay and expressly disagreed with the FTC’s view by filing an
amicus brief supporting the Eleventh Circuit decision in Schering-Plough. See generally Michael Perry,
Antitrust Liability for Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements After Tamoxifen and Schering-Plough, 12 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 166 (2006).
29
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Judge Richard Posner
made the statement in dictum.
30
Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1333.
31
Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1557, 1572.
32
Id. at 1581.
33
Id. at 1557, 1576.
34
Id. at 1561–67.
35
Id. at 1561, 1615.
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with a strong proposition of patent invalidity.36 The risks associated with litigation in a
pay-for-delay settlement, however, may completely outweigh the parties’ beliefs in the
patent’s validity when the two parties make a settlement decision. A settlement with
payment flowing in either direction is economically rational as long as the net present
value (NPV) of settlement exceeds that of litigation for both parties. This Article
systematically examines the economics associated with settlement and litigation and
shows that the asymmetric risks the two parties bear determines the direction in which the
payment will flow.
B. The Settlement Model
¶15

This Section develops the settlement model for a brand and a generic in a typical
Paragraph IV challenge. This Article uses p to denote the ex ante probability that the
patent is held invalid in trial, Rg to denote the reward the generic gets when it prevails in
trial, and Lb to denote the loss the brand suffers when the patent is held invalid. When the
patent is held valid in trial, the generic pays damages D to the brand. In addition, the cost
of litigation is Cg for the generic and Cb for the brand. When the two parties settle, the
settlement amount is S from brand to generic (if the generic pays the brand, then S has a
negative sign). Thus, this Article estimates the costs and rewards for the two parties as
shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Costs and Rewards for the Generic and the Brand in a Patent Dispute
COST/REWARD
Generic
Brand
Litigation cost
– Cg
– Cb
Patent valid (probability = 1 – p)
– Cg – D
– Cb + D
Patent invalid (probability = p)
– Cg + Rg
– Cb – Lb
Expected value of litigation
pRg – (1 – p)D – Cg
– pLb + (1 – p)D – Cb
Expected value of settlement
S
–S

¶16

For each party, settlement is preferred when expected value of settlement exceeds
expected value of litigation. For the generic, this means
S > pR g − (1 − p) D − C g
and for the brand, this means
− S > − pLb + (1 − p) D − Cb , or S < pLb − (1 − p) D + Cb .

Therefore, settlement is preferable for both parties when
pR g − (1 − p) D − C g < S < pLb − (1 − p) D + C b
.
¶17
We denote this range as the zone of reverse payment (ZORP). It should be noted
that p denotes the ex ante probability that the patent will be held invalid by a court and
that, for simplicity, we use a single p for both the brand and the generic. In reality, the
brand and the generic may have different estimates of p. However, the general
conclusion still holds that there exists a ZORP in which both parties prefer settlement and
the brand would choose to pay the generic to settle.
36

Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D.Ill. 2003).
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To examine when the payment would have flown the “usual” way, that is, from the
generic to the brand, we can check the “tipping point” of the above inequality by setting
the settlement amount S = 0. Thus, reverse payment is rational for the brand whenever
D − Cb
p>
Lb + D .

¶19

Interestingly, when there are no damages (D = 0), the right hand side of the above
inequality is negative, and, thus, reverse payment is never irrational for the brand. For
the generic, payment to the brand is rational when
D + Cg
p<
Rg + D
.
Again, when there are no damages, the generic would choose to pay the brand and settle
C
the case only when p < g . Since the cost of litigation is usually in the magnitude of
Rg
several million U.S. dollars, while the reward can be hundreds of millions of dollars
(unless the probability of prevailing in a trial is close to zero for the generic), the payment
is very unlikely to flow the “usual” way, from brand to generic. Even under that
circumstance, the generic may still launch the challenge because (1) the ex ante estimate
of the probability becomes fuzzy when it is small, and the generic is unlikely to
differentiate a one percent probability of success from a five percent probability, the latter
of which may make reverse payment rational; and (2) the generic may still bank on the
brand’s willingness to pay because the brand’s threshold to make reverse payments is
very small.
¶20
The range of ZORP depends on the parameters p, Rg, Lb, D, Cg and Cb, and we can
obtain a rough estimate based on commonly available data with a few assumptions. We
assume the revenue of the brand drug is Rb, the remaining patent life on the drug is np, the
revenue grows at rate g during the remaining patent life, and the discount rate is rb for the
brand and rg for the generic. The NPV of the patent is a reasonable proxy of the brand’s
loss Lb:
np
Rb &$ & 1 + g # #!
!
Lb =
1− $
rb − g $ $% 1 + rb !" !
%
".
If we further assume the revenue growth rate equals discount rate, or rb = g, then Lb is
reduced to Lb = npRb.
¶21
We will use this simplified formula of Lb for the discussion that follows. For the
generic, the reward can be approximated by the NPV of the revenue stream from the
generic product in a commodity market plus the value of the 180-day exclusivity, if there
is one. To estimate the former, we assume that in a stabilized market the generic product
sells at a discount of ds (measured as a fraction of the brand price), that the generic
penetration is cs, that there are k generic competitors, and that each one has an equal
market share. Thus, we can approximate the NPV of the generic revenue as a perpetuity:
Rdc
NPVrev = b s s
krg .
26
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To estimate the latter, we assume that, during the 180-day exclusivity period, the
generic product sells at a discount of de, the generic penetration is ce, and the generic
expects its launch in t years (the time it takes to win the trial or ANDA approval). Thus,
the value of the bounty is
Rd c
NPVbty = b e e t
2(1 + rg )
.
Therefore, the generic’s reward is
Rb d e ce
$ Rb d s c s
! kr + 2(1 + r ) t , with 180 - day exclusivity
g
g
!
Rg = #
! Rb d s c s , without 180 - day exclusivity
! krg
"
.
C. A Numeric Example

¶23

Here, we provide a simple numerical example to illustrate ZORP as a function of
the ex ante probability p. We assume the revenue of the brand drug Rb = $500 million,
the remaining patent life np = 9 years,37 revenue growth rate g = rb = rg = 7%, the
damages D = 0, and the cost of litigation Cg = Cb = $5 million. In addition, we assume
the generic price is 80% lower than the brand product (ds), generic penetration is 90%
(cs), and there are 5 generic manufacturers in a stabilized market (k = 5). During the
exclusivity period, the generic price is 25% lower than the brand (de = 75%), and generic
penetration is 40% (ce = 40%). Finally, we assume it takes three years before the generic
can launch its product (t = 3).38 Thus, we have (all numbers are U.S. dollars in millions)
Lb = 4,500 and Rg = 318.37 with the 180-day exclusivity. We demonstrate ZORP as a
function of p and S in Figure 1. It can be seen that there is a wide settlement range within
which the brand is willing to make a reverse payment to the generic even if the
probability of losing its patent in a trial is fairly small. On the other hand, the generic
will choose litigation over settlement only if its ex ante probability of prevailing in a trial
is very high and the settlement amount is very small. For instance, when the NPV of
total reverse payment to a first-filer is $150 million (S = 150),39 ZORP is reached when
3.2% < p < 47.9%. Thus, the brand is willing to pay the generic a significant amount and
settle as long as there is a minute chance of losing the patent in a trial, whereas the
generic is willing to accept the payment and settle when it does not have strong belief that
it will prevail at trial. No collusion or conspiracy is necessary for a pay-for-delay
settlement to happen, as both parties are making economically rational decisions. The
“tipping point” for a first-filer generic to make a rational decision to settle and pay the
37

The average useful patent life for a brand drug is 11.7 years. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30756, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF
1984 ("THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT") 33–34 (2005). No ANDA filing will be accepted by the FDA in the
first 3 years after NDA approval. Id. at 24. So 9 years seem to be a reasonable estimate.
38

The time can be the waiting period for a court decision or the thirty-month stay for ANDA approval.
This would be equivalent to an annual payment of $23 million from the brand to the generic for the next
nine years of the remaining patent life given the aforementioned discount rate.
39
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brand is attained when p < 1.6%. In this case, the “usual” flow of payment is unlikely to
happen.
¶24
In Figure 1, the ZORP strikingly demonstrates how wide the gap is between the
brand’s threshold and the generic’s threshold. Even as the amount of the reverse
payment increases, a brand may still be reluctant move from settlement to litigation
because its probability threshold increases very slowly. The threshold of the generic
increases rapidly, however, making it much more willing to choose settlement, since the
brand is willing to pay more. Even when the ex ante probability of prevailing in a trial
for the generic is high and the model suggests that litigation has a higher expected value,
a risk-averse generic may still choose settlement with a reverse payment; that is, a sure
gain today is worth more than a larger but uncertain one tomorrow.40 The only area in
the ZORP that arguably could suggest collusion is where the generic knows ex ante that
its probability to win is 100% but still chooses settlement because the brand is willing to
pay more than the generic’s reward from litigation. Theoretically, this could happen in
the area where the generic’s threshold is flat at 100%, as shown in Figure 1 (note the
reason the threshold is flat is because that is capped at 100%, otherwise the calculation
would lead to a higher threshold). Such an area, however, is of little practical
significance because (1) ex ante, no one can be 100% certain they will prevail in a trial;
(2) even if the generic is 100% certain, it is evidentially challenging to prove so; and (3)
it is still economically reasonable for the brand to unilaterally decide to make reverse
payments because its threshold is so low.
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FIGURE 1. Zone of Reverse Payment as a Function of Settlement Amount and Ex Ante
Probability of Patent Being Held Invalid

0

100

200

300

400

500

Settlement Amount ($M)

40

Such risk aversion behavior has been thoroughly discussed in psychology literature. See, e.g., Daniel
Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39
MGMT. SCI. 17, 18–19 (1993).
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The green line represents the threshold of the ex ante probability that the patent is
held invalid in a trial, above which the brand is willing to settle and make a reverse
payment. The red line represents the threshold of the ex ante probability, below which
the first-filer generic is willing to settle and accept a reverse payment. The light blue
region represents the ZORP, within which both parties prefer settlement and the brand is
willing to pay the generic.
D. Launch at Risk

¶26

A generic may launch its generic product while the patent dispute is still pending, a
movement called launch at risk. Launch at risk can be examined using our settlement
model by setting reasonable damages. When the generic is facing potential damages, the
dynamics of settlement could be completely changed. Using the same example as in
Section III-C, assume the generic has to pay different amounts of damages if it loses the
trial and estimate the same probability thresholds for the brand and the generic, as well as
ZORP. Using damage awards of $50 million, $150 million, $250 million, and $500
million—representing small, moderate, large and exceptional damages, respectively—the
model estimates the probability thresholds necessary for the brand and the generic to
prefer settlement as a function of settlement amount. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Thus, when damages are small or moderate, a large proportion of settlements still occur
within the ZORP, meaning a brand is still willing to pay. Only when the generic faces
large potential losses with litigation and the brand expects a huge reward from winning
the trial would the payment have gone the “usual” way.
¶27
Additionally, there is still a striking gap between the brand’s threshold and the
generic’s threshold, regardless of the amount of damages. The generic can easily exploit
this gap because the brand is willing to pay to settle when it has a slight chance to lose.
Another factor for the generic to consider in a launch at risk is that the brand may be
willing to settle, effectively reducing the amount of damages the generic would have to
pay if it lost the trial, thereby reducing risks to the generic of launching. In practice, we
see relatively few launches at risk, likely due to a narrower ZORP and the existence of a
zone of “usual” payment. This is especially so when the potential damages the generic
faces are large.
E. Evaluation of Circuit Court Decisions
¶28

This Section evaluates circuit court decisions on pay-for-delay settlements using
the settlement model. Table 2 provides a summary of the cases. Table 2 shows
information about the settlement amount, revenue of the brand drug, and the remaining
patent life of brands, obtained from United States courts of appeals and district court
opinions, case briefs, amicus briefs, and other supporting documents pertaining to the
cases. All numbers are shown in present value as of the time of settlement (PV) and are
rounded to first decimal point. The growth and discount rates used were g = rb = rg = 7%.
Because none of those cases were launch-at-risk cases, the model assumes there are no
damages, or D = 0. The litigation costs used were Cg = Cb = $5 million. In addition,
sensitivity analysis was performed by varying the discount rate from 5% to 15% and
litigation costs from $2 million to $10 million, giving results for a range of probability
threshold for the brand and the generic. Table 3 shows the results.
29
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The settlement model suggests that these reverse payments were indeed
economically rational decisions. In all United States courts of appeals’ decisions, the
probability threshold for the brand to make a reverse payment was extremely low,
ranging from about one percent for Cardizem to slightly over six percent for Cipro.
Thus, the reverse payments were consistent with a brand’s risk aversion. By paying a
small premium, the brands avoided the risks of litigation and patent invalidation.
Additionally, the sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the range of the brand’s threshold
was fairly narrow for all cases when different discount rates and litigation costs were
used, suggesting that a brand will likely make a calculated decision to pay and settle even
after careful risk analysis. The results for the generics were more dispersed and are
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
¶30
For Cipro and Schering-Plough, the generic would need a fairly strong belief in
patent invalidity in order to choose litigation over reverse payment. For Cardizem, the
economically rational decision for the generic would be litigation, as long as the generic
has some moderate belief in patent invalidity, that is, a little more than twenty percent.
However, several features of this case were notable. First, the payment agreement was
contingent on a complicated set of events, each one of which would trigger a stoppayment.41 Second, the settlement amount of $89.9 million was just a one-year payment,
because Andrx obtained ANDA approval in July 1998 and launched its generic in June
1999.42 Thus, the amount of $89.9 million does not faithfully represent the expected
value of payment from HMR to Andrx, although it may serve as a lower bound.
¶31
A better estimate can be obtained by calculating the probability of each event and
using the expected value of the total payment conditioned on those events. An upper
bound can be roughly estimated by assuming the $89.9 million continues annually (for
13.4 years) until patent expiration, which leads to a total payment of $765.6 million (in
1998 present value) and a probability threshold of 9.9% for the HMR and 100% for Barr,
respectively. Even considering these factors, it is still reasonable for the brand to pay,
because its risk tolerance is sufficiently low and it is always better for the generic to
settle. Notably, the sensitivity analysis shows that the generic’s probability threshold is
highly variable, meaning that a slight change in its assumptions of discount rate and
litigation cost would have required a relatively strong belief in patent invalidity, as
opposed to a moderate one.

41
42

Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 at 902–03, 903 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 903.
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FIGURE 2. Settlement Payment and Threshold for the Brand and the Generic When the
Generic Faces Damages

¶32

Again, the green line represents the threshold of the ex ante probability that the
patent is held invalid in a trial, above which the brand is willing to settle and make a
reverse payment of given settlement amount. The red line represents the threshold of the
ex ante probability, below which the first-filer generic is willing to settle and accept a
reverse payment. The light apricot region represents the “zone of usual payment,” within
which both parties prefer settlement and the generic is willing to pay the brand. The light
blue region represents the ZORP, within which both parties prefer settlement and the
brand is willing to pay the generic.
¶33
Therefore, a generic may well accept a smaller reverse payment in order to hedge
its litigation risk even if the expected payoff from litigation could be higher. For
Tamoxifen, it may seem that litigation would be a better choice for Barr because it only
needed a 37% or greater probability to win in order for the expected value of litigation to
exceed the settlement value. However, the sensitivity analysis again revealed a very wide
range for the threshold. Further, the settlement amount was relatively small, but,
arguably, the non-exclusive license granted to Barr was far more valuable. If we assume
Barr gets 25% of Zeneca’s revenue through the license, the total settlement amount
would be $634.5 million, and the probability threshold would be 27.2% for Zeneca and
100% for Barr, points at which it was still not unreasonable for both parties to settle.
¶34
Therefore, reverse payment alone, as demonstrated by the above assessment, is not
direct evidence of collusion. In fact, it is not even a strong piece of circumstantial
evidence. The reason we observe these reverse payments is that a wide gap exists
between the brand’s risk tolerance and the generic’s willingness to litigate, given the
economic payoff for each party. A per se prohibition of reverse payment would totally
neglect the asymmetric risks the brand and the generic bear, as well as, the economic
rationality. Instead, a fair analysis would be to place reverse payment in the context of
the entire settlement package and apply a Rule of Reason test. Clearly, most United
States courts of appeals follow this rationale, and we believe the Sixth Circuit overemphasized the reverse payment in its Cardizem decision.
31
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F. Cost of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation
¶35

In addition to the economic rationales examined in our settlement model, a sound
public policy should also consider the indirect costs of pharmaceutical patent litigation.
Determining whether a patent is valid is costly, particularly in the pharmaceutical
industry. Full litigation can take several years. For the brand, there are direct costs
associated with litigation, including attorney fees, discovery expenses, and extensive
expert testimony; there are also tremendous indirect costs, such as access to trade secrets
during discovery and an inability to invest in R&D and marketing due to uncertainty
about predicted revenue stream. More importantly, the possibility of losing the
protection on a valid patent for a blockbuster drug in a trial, even if minute, looms large
for the brand. Embracing that rationale, Daniel Crane argues that an option for settlement
is like insurance to encourage innovation. Absent that insurance, risk-averse brand firms
will be less likely to commit capital to R&D.43
¶36
Consumers suffer losses as well. The litigation costs incurred by the brand and the
generic are ultimately passed on to consumers in some form. The brand may increase
price in anticipation of litigation, leading to additional, unnecessary deadweight loss.
Furthermore, an economic study on market output upon generic entry that included 101
brand drugs has shown that there is a substantial short-term loss of market output as a
result of precipitation of brand marketing.44 The short-run decline will create a consumer
welfare loss of approximately $400,000 per month for each drug facing generic entry.45
Such a loss cannot be explained by classic price competition theory but is attributed to
loss of non-price competition benefits conferred via brand marketing. Those benefits
include continuing professional education and patient awareness for under-diagnosed
diseases as well as preventative care.46 Because the brand cannot economically sustain
its marketing activities when its revenue drops eighty percent after generic entry, those
benefits are lost, resulting in inefficiency in market output.47 It takes several years for the
benefits of price-reduction to dominate the negative output caused by inefficiencies in
non-price competition.48
¶37
Uncertainty about patent litigation can lead to similar inefficiencies, as a brand
often suspends certain marketing activities when the case is pending. Allowing the brand
to settle will dispel those uncertainties and help restore adequate marketing activities,
maximizing non-price competition benefits to consumers. Note that, although the FTC
holds the position that consumers suffer a loss up to $3.5 billion per year due to pay-fordelay settlements,49 its estimation method has recently been challenged on legal and

43

See Crane, supra note 13, at 762.
Darius Lakdawalla, Tomas Philipson & Y. Richard Wang, Intellectual Property and Marketing 24–28
(AEI Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 07-20, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089045.
45
Id. at 2–3.
46
In general, marketing to healthcare providers include four major forms: detailing, continuing medical
education (CME), samples, and gifting. The last technique has been largely restricted with the Physician
Payment Sunshine Act.
47
Lakdawalla et al., supra note 44, at 24–26. The quantity of total sales for an average drug falls 5% within
five months of patent expiration and is attributed to diminishing advertising.
48
Id. at 2.
49
FTC REPORT, supra note 155, at 2.
44
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economic grounds.50 The short-term loss of consumer welfare due to alleged settlements
and resulting delay in generic entry, after appropriate adjustment by several factors, is in
fact minimal.51 Long-term loss is still possible, but, again, can only be substantiated via
an antitrust claim when the underlying patent is ex ante invalid.
¶38
Finally, social costs of litigation cannot be ignored. Trial is an imperfect tool to
resolve patent validity. While litigation may help reduce false positives (invalid patents
otherwise thought to be valid), it may also lead to false negatives (valid patents held
invalid). Those false negatives are extremely costly for pharmaceutical patents, because
of huge R&D spending, leading to undesired deterrence of innovation. The Sixth Circuit
has held that the constitutional interest is equally injured when an invalid patent is held
valid and a valid patent is held invalid.52 Thus, a unilateral requirement to resolve
pharmaceutical patent validity through trial may upset the very congressional intent to
encourage innovation by granting patents.
G. Antitrust Law and Industry-specific Regulation
¶39

Antitrust analysis of business practices, even if derived from the Hatch-Waxman
Act, should be conducted within the well-established antitrust framework. Industryspecific regulation does not by itself impose antitrust liability, although it provides
context in evaluating the totality of circumstances. Professor Hemphill has argued that
the intent of the bounty is to encourage litigation, rather than settlement; therefore, payfor-delay settlements should be presumed to be illegal and placed under close scrutiny.53
Our settlement model indicates that congressional intent to strike weak patents54 has not
been best attained in practice, because the generic is overtly incentivized to challenge
every valuable patent due to the low risk and high reward of such a challenge. Thus, a
case-by-case analysis of each settlement is fairer to the settling parties than that strong
presumption of illegality. In a case study on Glaxo’s patented antibiotic Augmentin,
which is not subject to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the findings suggested that the bounty is
not necessary to induce generics to challenge a brand’s patent, but that economic reward
is needed.55 Other generic launches-at-risk that occurprior to a favorable ruling that a
patent is invalid have also been documented and, not surprisingly, the have all been on
blockbuster drugs.56 Additionally, under the current incentive structure, bounty hunting
50

See Anjan Chatterji & Xiang Yu, Impact of Reverse Exclusionary Settlements on Consumer Welfare: A
Law and Economic Analysis. 23 A.B.A. ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., JULY 2010, AT 1, 2—9.
51
Id. at 5.
52
Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d. 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1976).
53
See Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1596 (proposing a rebuttable presumption that reverse payment
settlements are illegal and allocating to the brand the burden to prove the settlement is not anticompetitive).
54
Pay To Delay: Are Patent Settlements that Delay Generic Drug Market Entry Anticompetitive?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 9 (2009) (prepared statement of Richard Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade
Comm’n).
55

Jeremiah Helm, Comment, The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry into a Blockbuster
Pharmaceutical Market in the Absence of FDA Incentives, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 175, 191
(2007).
56
See, e.g., John Carreyrou & Joann S. Lublin, Emergency Room: How Bristol-Myers Fumbled Defense of
$4 Billion Drug, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (Apotex launched a generic version of Plavix while the
district court adjudication of patent infringement was still pending.); Press Release, Barr Pharmaceuticals,
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generics are more likely to challenge brand drugs with high revenue (hundreds of
millions of dollars or more) rather than those with truly weak patents, even if the
probability of success is lower in the former.57
¶40
Such a viewpoint is supported by a recent Supreme Court decision Pacific Bell
Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications Inc.58 In Linkline, the Court rejected the
argument that industry-specific regulations, mandated by federal agencies, have
precedence over the Sherman Act.59 Upholding an earlier decision,60 the Court
reemphasized that industry-related public law does not create antitrust claims that go
beyond existing antitrust standards. The Court did not examine the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant under the specifics of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), but under those of the Sherman Act, and found no liability.61
IV. CONCLUSION
¶41

In conclusion, our settlement model suggests that, for most pay-for-delay
settlements, the reverse payment is economically rational for both the brand and the
generic. Consistent with observations, our model also predicts that launch at risk is rare
because the generic faces potentially large damages. Analysis of United States courts of
appeals cases indicates that settlement and reverse payment are consistent with a brand’s
risk-aversion. Allowing settlement is not inconsistent with the congressional intent
embedded in the Hatch-Waxman Act to balance innovation and promotion of consumer
welfare through generic entry. Reverse payments should not constitute prima facie
evidence of collusion to horizontal market division but should be analyzed in the totality
of all circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Ex ante evidence of patent validity should

Inc., Barr Says Court Denies Preliminary Injunction to Halt Generic Allegra(R) Sales (Jan. 27, 2006),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=60908&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=809655 (Barr and Teva
marketed a generic version of Allegra before a district court’s decision on a patent infringement action
brought by Aventis.).
57
See, e.g., Pfizer Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 6. To obtain a rough estimate in the
industry, take the data from the FTC Report. The total revenue for drugs facing Paragraph IV challenge is
$90 billion per year. FTC REPORT, supra note 15, at 9. A rough estimate of the number of drugs challenged
per year is 107. Chatterji & Yu, supra note 5, at 5. Thus, the average revenue for each challenged drug is
about $90 billion divided by 107, which equals $841 million, meaning that drugs being challenged are
blockbuster ones. The above estimate is very rough, and the median should be more meaningful than the
mean as the revenue is likely to be skewed by huge blockbusters; at least that estimate, however, gives
some idea of what the typical drugs being challenged are.
58
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). In Linkline, the plaintiffs alleged
that AT&T engaged in an unlawful “price squeeze” act in violation of the antitrust law. Id. at 449–50. The
Ninth Circuit denied AT&T’s motion for judgment on pleading and the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at
446–48. The Court reasoned that, because AT&T has no duty to sell its wholesale transport service to
competitors under the Sherman Act and such a duty comes from the regulation of the Federal
Communications Commission, AT&T has no obligation to provide its rivals a “sufficient” level of service.
Id. at 450.
59
Id. at 450.
60
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004). The
Supreme Court held that to state an antitrust claim, one must first allege an antitrust duty under the antitrust
law rather than other federal regulations. Id.
61
Linkline, 555 U.S. at 451–55.
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be carefully considered in order to determine whether consumer welfare is unreasonably
impaired beyond the scope of patent protection.
TABLE 2. Summary of Circuit Cases
Case

Circuit Product

PPIV
Settlement Patent
Key Settlement Terms Ruling
Certification Date
Expiration
Cardizem 6th
Diltiazem
Non9/24/1997 2/15/2011 HMR pays Andrx
Illegal
hydroinfringing
$40M/yr from date of
chloride CR
ANDA approval to the
earliest of a set of
events†;
Andrx retains 180-day
exclusivity
Tamoxifen 2nd
Tamoxifen
Invalid
3/5/1993
8/20/2002 Zeneca pays Barr $21M Legal
citrate
and grants a nonexclusive license to
Barr;
Zeneca pays Heumann
$9.5M and $35.9M over
next 10 years
Cipro
Federal Ciprofloxacin Invalid
1/8/1997
6/9/2004
Bayer pays Barr
Legal
hydro$49.1M;
chloride
Bayer supplies Cipro to
Barr or makes quarterly
payment to Barr until
12/31/2003‡
Schering- 11th
Potassium
Non6/17/1997 9/5/2006
Schering makes no
Legal
Plough
chloride ER
infringing
payment to Upsher;
Schering acquires
Niacor-SR from
Upsher||;
Schering pays ESI $5M
†
The set of events include: (1) a final and unappealable order or judgment in the patent infringement case; (2)
the earlier date of (a) expiration of required notice period or (b) Andrx starts commercial sale if HMR notifies its
intention to license to a third party; and (3) the effective date of license if Andrx exercises its option to obtain a
license from HMR. Total payment was $89.93 million from July 1998 to June 1999.
‡
Total payment amounts to $398.1 million, representing 6.5% of Bayer’s total revenue ($6.1 billion) during that
period.
||
Schering pays (1) $60 million in initial royalty fees; (2) $10 million in milestone royalty fees; and (3) ten to
fifteen percent royalty on sales.
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TABLE 3. Estimates of ZORP for Circuit Cases (all numbers except patent life and
probabilities in million dollar settlement year PV)
Case
BRAND
GENERIC
Reve- Patent Loss
nue
Life

Cardizem 571.41 13.4

7,656.9

Tamoxifen

257.22 9.4

2,315.2

Cipro

670.93 7.4

4,696.45

Schering- 234.34 9.2
Plough
1

2,155.4

Settle- Probability NPV of
ment Threshold Generic
(Range)
Revenue
89.3
1.1%
293.9
(1.0%,
1.4%)
6
55.7
2.1%
132.3
(1.8%,
3.6%)
7
306.5 6.1%
345.0
(6.2%,
6.5%)
8
70.0
3.0%
120.5
(2.6%,
3.9%)

NPV
Total
of
Reward
Bounty
70.0
363.8

31.5

163.8

82.1

427.2

28.7

149.2

Probability
Threshold
(Range)
26.1%
(17.8%,
60.2%)
37.1%
(23.5%,
99.3%)
72.9%
(53.9%,
100%)
50.3%
(33.9%,
100%)

Cardizem CD revenue was $700 million. Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (E.D. Mich. 2000). We assume
it to be 2000 revenue.
2
Tamoxifen domestic revenue was $442 million in 2001. Tamofixen, 466 F.3d 187, 193 n.6 (2nd Cir. 2006).
3
Derived as annual cash inflow from the total revenue of Cipro during a seven-year period. See infra note 5.
4
K-Dur 20 domestic revenue was $287 million in 2000. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL
1488085, at s*6 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002) 27.
5
Bayer’s total revenue from Cipro was $6.1 billion during the settlement payment period. We assume equal
annual cash inflow and discount to 1997 PV.
6
Includes $21 million to Barr, $9.5 million to Heumann, and ten equal annual payments of $3.59 million.
7
Total payments were $398.1 million. We assume equal annual payment and discount to 1997 PV.
8
Because there was no payment, we use the $60 million initial royalty and $10 million milestone royalties for
acquisition of Niacor-SR.
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